Extracts from interview with Colonel J.K.Tanner OBE, chief of staff, Multinational Division South East [the British-controlled division, commanded by Major-General Andrew Stewart], Op Telic 3, Dec 03- June 04
[Retyped from the original version for source protection reasons. The complete response to each question is given but not all questions are included]
Q : Did you receive the correct level of advice and support for the nation-building task that the Division faced ?
A : We got virtually no advice for nation-building and we had to make up a lot of things ourselves. Surprisingly, as a result, we got ahead of the Americans in the North. I was particularly lucky because I enjoyed complete support from PJHQ [Permanent Joint Headquarters, the main UK-based operational command HQ] over nearly everything. Unfortunately, they often did not have the resources to give us as these were embedded in the CPA [the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad.]
At that level the bureaucratic inefficiency, the inability to spend money, even though it was there, and the frustrations that this caused were immense. This was compounded by US commercial practices as their system of contracts seemed designed to exclude all other but US business.
The whole system was appalling. We experienced real difficulty in dealing with the American military and civilian organisations who, partly through arrogance and partly through bureaucracy, dictate that there is only one way: the American way. As far as the Iraqis were concerned, here was a nation who could put people on the moon but who could not, or would not, fix the electricity supply. You need to have money in order to make things happen, to buy protection from the looters, to smooth out tribal problems and to have immediate and visible effect and we did not have that. Despite our so-called 'special relationship' I reckon that we were treated no differently to the Portugese.
I did not really get too involved in the political side. We were fortunate that there remained quite a residue of Iraqi folklore from long ago that the British would treat them fairly. The British soldier himself also has an ability to get on with people even though he cannot speak the language. The Dutch, Danes and Norwegians achieved the same but at the other extreme I believe that many of the problems experienced by the Italians and Rumanians were caused by their inability to treat with the Arabs.
Q : Did the role of HQ Multinational Division South East clash with the role of HQ COMBRITFOR ? [commander British forces - a job also simultaneously held by General Stewart]
A : There was no conflict between the two roles of MND (SE) and COMBRITFOR though there were occasions when we got close to threatening the Italians that if they did not carry out operations we would insert British soldiers to do them instead. As far as our lead nation status was concerned, the NSE [National Support Element] provided life support for the Headquarters and we also provided the Signals regiment.
Q : Do you have advice on operating with Coalition Forces ?
A : I realise now that I am a European, not an American. We managed to get on better militarily and administratively with our European partners and indeed at times with the Arabs than with the Americans. Europeans chat to each other whereas dialogue is alien to the US military.
They need to reintroduce dialogue as a tool of command because, although it is easy to speak to Americans face-to-face and understand each other completely, dealing with them corporately is akin to dealing with a group of Martians. If it isn't on the PowerPoint slide, it doesn't happen.
General Sanchez [US commander] visited us once in seven months, I spoke only once to the COS [chief of staff] of the [US] corps headquarters and it was only when an old acquaintance General Metz [commander 3 US Corps] took over that dialogue actually began. There was no COS forum until my last month when the US 3 Corps staff were in place and trying to speak to the Headquarters to arrange visits for discussion proved impossible. Eventually we tried communicating through the embedded British staff officers in CJTF-7 [Coalition Joint Task Force 7] but the Headquarters proved impenetrable.
Source du texte : TELEGRAPH.CO.UK
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